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
WHAT THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT COUNTERING  
THE EFFECTS OF ADVERSARY PROPAGANDA

by

Jeffrey L. Feldman  
Major, USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

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## **Abstract**

Joint doctrine provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with limited practical guidance on how to counter adversary propaganda. Slobodan Milosevic's use of propaganda during Operation ALLIED FORCE highlights the need to prepare for this asymmetric threat. The joint force will likely face a future adversary who attempts to use this tool. This threat might surface at any level of war, and across the spectrum of conflict. Ingenuity and motivation may be a future adversary's only limitations. The JFC can implement three categories of measures to counter the effects of propaganda. All of these recommendations can be implemented with existing resources.

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## Introduction

Joint doctrine provides limited practical guidance on how to execute a key Defensive Information Operations (DIO) task: countering adversary propaganda. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) should do three things to reduce the impact of enemy propaganda: organize their Information Operations (IO) personnel to plan and execute counter-propaganda measures; "routinize" interaction among those responsible for counter-propaganda; and conduct challenging exercises that enhance joint force readiness to meet, and defeat, the effects of adversary propaganda. All of these tasks can be done with existing resources.

A future adversary may possess sophisticated propaganda capabilities. This paper will illustrate how this threat is relevant to the JFC, by analyzing the impact of Serbian propaganda during Operation ALLIED FORCE. It will propose specific measures that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might have implemented to negate Serbian propaganda. A survey of applicable joint Defensive IO (DIO) doctrine will reveal areas needing modification. Finally, this paper will recommend measures that the JFC can implement to negate the effects that adversary propaganda might have on mission accomplishment.

The intent of this paper is to focus at the operational level of war, yet the nature of IO makes this problematic. Joint doctrine states that IO will "apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war."<sup>1</sup> It also prescribes the participation of at least 15 command and staff functions, representatives from all service and functional components, as well as all supporting commands.<sup>2</sup> This paper will analyze what

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Publication 3-13: *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, 09 OCT 98, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. IV-3.

four capabilities and activities contribute to the propaganda fight: the IO staff section, the Intelligence staff section (J2), Public Affairs (PA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

### **The Value of Propaganda**

Propaganda is used to modify opinions, attitudes, and--ultimately--behavior (see Glossary). It is employed in ways that suit its user's interests. Propaganda is a powerful tool that can aid in creating the conditions for success, and in achieving a desired endstate. The doctrinal definition of propaganda might lead the reader to associate the term with U.S. forces responsible for communicating to internal or external audiences.

U.S. military Public Affairs (PA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel, though communicating to different audiences, each seek to project the truth. Both consider credibility fundamental to their effectiveness. Joint PA and PSYOP doctrine both highlight the important link between conveying truthful messages and maintaining credibility.<sup>3</sup> U.S. PSYOP does not stray from the truth to any greater extent than PA messages contain "spin". Some have argued that PA officers have "overlooked their own reliance on spin," out of a fervent desire to maintain their reputation for credibility.<sup>4</sup>

This paper uses the term propaganda to refer to its employment for corrupt purposes. This type of propaganda has little or no basis in fact, and represents an active attempt to distort the truth. So defined, propaganda can establish irrational hatred and bias, exaggerate existing prejudices, create or bolster solidarity, or it can simply be used to lead its audience

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<sup>3</sup> Joint Publication 3-53: *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, 10 JUL 96, p. I-5; and Joint Pub. 3-61: *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 14 MAY 97, pp. III-12 and III-18.

<sup>4</sup> COL W.C. Garrison, "Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public Affairs", U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17 MAR 99, p. 6. COL Garrison contrasts the view of U.S. PA personnel with that of civilian journalists, some of whom consider "spin" synonymous with the theme of a given story.

astray from adverse truths. The JFC needs to implement protection measures against adversary propaganda, just as he would against any other threat.

Counter-propaganda aims to neutralize or minimize the effects of adversary propaganda (see Glossary). It seeks to exploit vulnerabilities in an opponent's propaganda messages and strategy.<sup>5</sup> Counter-propaganda measures are protective in nature; however, they may involve both offensive and defensive actions in order to prevent an IO threat from interfering with mission accomplishment (see Glossary).<sup>6</sup> Counter-propaganda actions enhance "full dimensional protection", and contribute to attaining synergy among the elements of the joint force; thus, they contribute to obtaining victory in the shortest possible time (see Glossary).<sup>7</sup>

### **Why the JFC Should be Concerned About Enemy Propaganda**

Military forces can expect to operate for an extended period of time in an area where sophisticated, robust, indigenous media competes with the U.S. military PSYOP message. While the U.S. military is years ahead of its competitors in terms of military technology, in terms of PSYOP there are already competitors on par with or even arguably more sophisticated than the United States.<sup>8</sup>

The Defense Science Board's (DSB) report reflects the need to ensure that we are capable of having our message heard. It also alludes to potential competitors in the "information war". A U.S. Joint Forces Command plan illustrates how the DSB's findings apply to the JFC:

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<sup>5</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.30: *Psychological Operations*, 19 JUN 00, p. 10-9.

<sup>6</sup> Joint Publication 3-13: *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, 09 OCT 98, p. I-16.

<sup>7</sup> "Full Dimensional Protection" enables the JFC to protect his forces and assets from threats that might hinder mission accomplishment. These threats included adversary use of IO. See Joint Vision 2020: pp. 26-27, for additional details on "Full Dimensional Protection". Joint Publication 3-13: *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, 09 OCT 98, p. III-1, describes defensive IO as "an integral part of overall force protection." A summarized definition of "synergy"--a fundamental element of operational art--is included in the Glossary provided with this paper.

<sup>8</sup> MAY 2000 Report of the U.S. Defense Science Board as cited by Bryan Bender, "Revamp Urged for USA's PSYOPs Programme", *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 11 OCT 00, p. 12.

Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) require the means to implement IO throughout the range of military operations at the theater-strategic and operational levels. Defensive Information Operations (DIO) protect our information environment and are conducted through programs for: information assurance, physical security, OPSEC, counter-deception, counter-propaganda operations, counterintelligence, and electronic warfare.<sup>9</sup>

A recent Central Intelligence Agency report asserts that "adversaries will seek to attack U.S. military capabilities through PSYOP for the purpose of undermining U.S. domestic support for U.S. actions."<sup>10</sup> Rapid advances in technology, prompt media presence in crisis areas, and increased internet use, all combine to offer opportunities for adversaries to disseminate their message to a global audience. Ingenuity and motivation may be a future opponent's only limitations.

Adversaries whose actions have spurious legitimacy may attempt to employ propaganda as a means of attaining a relative advantage.<sup>11</sup> Propaganda can therefore be considered an asymmetric capability. When creatively employed by a clever opponent, propaganda can represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. interests. Adversary propaganda is a threat to the extent that it is believed by those exposed to it. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to analyze enemy capabilities to employ propaganda, and to take appropriate measures to negate its impact. The need to implement counter-propaganda measures (like the conduct of IO in general) is relevant to all levels of war, and applicable to each phase of operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. Recognition of the threat imposed by

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<sup>9</sup> The United States Atlantic Command's (USACOM) "Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000 (CPLAN 00)," SEP 99, p. A-38. USACOM has since been renamed U.S. Joint Forces Command.

<sup>10</sup> Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts." See section titled: "Future Conflict". Accessed 07 JAN 01 via the Internet at: <http://www.cia.gov/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>

<sup>11</sup> The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz contends that the interactive nature of war leads adversaries to continually seek to achieve a relative advantage, in order to facilitate attaining their desired aims. Experts on Clausewitzian theory assert that this search for relative advantage "forecloses the possibility of a monopoly on wisdom for either [warring party]" (italics in original). See Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War Classical Strategic Thought*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996), p. 212.



adversary propaganda, and the desire to counter its effects, have recently attracted increased attention at the national strategic level.

Deficiencies identified during military operations in Kosovo led to the release of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68: International Public Information. PDD 68 established an interagency group whose two functions are to: "influence foreign audiences' in support of U.S. foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of the United States."<sup>12</sup> The IPI group provides a mechanism to "synchronize the information objectives, themes and messages that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent and mitigate crises and to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives."<sup>13</sup>

The IPI group will establish "targets and projects for each region, country, and functional area," and will be integrated into U.S. Embassy Mission Performance Plans (MPPs).<sup>14</sup> The Group will perform overt activities addressing only foreign audiences; however, its actions will be "deconflicted' and 'synchronized'" with domestic information "to avoid contradictory messages."<sup>15</sup> Additionally, "the IPI Core Group will arrange training exercises at the National Defense University, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the Service War Colleges' and other institutions."<sup>16</sup>

IPI activities might affect the JFC in several ways. The integration of the Group's functions into U.S. Embassy MPPs, and the establishment of regional objectives, will likely

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<sup>12</sup> Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68: International Public Information (IPI), 30 APR 99, p.1. Accessed 11 DEC 00 via the Internet at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm>. See also Zachary P. Hubbard, "Information Warfare in Kosovo," *Journal of Electronic Defense*, 22 (11), 01 NOV 99, pp. 57-60; and Ben Barber, "Group Will Battle Propaganda Abroad; Intends to Gain Foreign Support for U.S.", *The Washington Times*, 28 JUL 99, p.A1.

<sup>13</sup> PDD 68: IPI, 30 APR 99, p.1.

<sup>14</sup> Public Law 105-277: U.S. Department of State Reorganization Plan and Report, 30 DEC 98. Accessed 12 JAN 01 via the Internet at: [http://www.state.gov/www/global/general\\_foreign\\_policy/rpt\\_981230\\_reorg6.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/general_foreign_policy/rpt_981230_reorg6.html)

<sup>15</sup> PDD 68: IPI, 30 APR 99, p.1.

effect a CINC's Theater Engagement Plan. The IPI group's country objectives will need to be synchronized (or at least deconflicted) with operations in an established Joint Area of Operation (JOA). Initiatives such as the IPI illustrate how the JFC may be involved in executing tasks beyond the operational level of war.

Are the propaganda threat and measures to counter it only a strategic-level concern? Clearly not. Joint publication 2-01.3 identifies adversary propaganda as factor affecting both the strategic and the operational level battlespace.<sup>17</sup> Joint Defensive IO doctrine prescribes the need for coordination and synchronization of actions among: all levels of war, military and nonmilitary elements, as well as among organizations both internal and external to the JFC.<sup>18</sup> Advances in communications technology, media presence in conflict areas, and 24-hour-a-day news cycles further contribute to a blurring of lines between the traditional levels of war.<sup>19</sup>

Effectively countering adversary propaganda will require a definitive understanding of roles and responsibilities, as well as adequate synchronization of efforts, among all levels of war. These factors will also need to be addressed intra-theater between the CINC and the Joint Task Force Commander. The characteristics of modern conflict can confront the JFC with the need to employ operational-level assets--as part of an integrated, multi-level approach--to defeat adversary propaganda. Use of PSYOP during Operation ALLIED FORCE is an example of this interaction among the levels of war. Radio and television messages designed to isolate Milosevic as the aggressor were developed by PSYOP forces

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Publication 2-01.3: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)*, 24 MAY 00, p. I-7.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Pub 3-13: *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, 09 OCT 98, p. III-4.

<sup>19</sup> General John J. Sheehan, "Building the Right Military for the 21st Century." *Strategic Review*, Summer 1997, p. 23.

and transmitted by Commando Solo.<sup>20</sup> Thus, operational-level resources were used to achieve operational, theater, and strategic objectives.

### **The Likely Targets of Adversary Propaganda**

Whose perceptions might an adversary be interested in shaping (and therefore what target sets should be protected)? Joint publication 3-13 identifies "information systems" as a set of potential vulnerabilities.<sup>21</sup> This category includes "human factors" (decision-makers), although it is predominantly comprised of information equipment.<sup>22</sup> A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst argues that humans are the Center of Gravity (COG) within information systems--not technology.<sup>23</sup> It is humans who accept or ignore information when making decisions. Affecting the human decision-making process is the focus of propaganda.

Adversaries might also opt to attack U.S. forces with propaganda; however, this represents a comparatively low-value target, one that is more difficult to access, and one that would require a greater commitment of propaganda resources. U.S. forces have historically proven resistant to propaganda. This is due largely to superior discipline and leadership, and effective command information programs. A cost-benefit analysis will likely lead opponents to channel their effort and resources toward more lucrative targets. Greater gains might be had by communicating propaganda to mass audiences, either by using an adversary's resources, or by having propaganda unwittingly broadcast by commercial media.

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<sup>20</sup> Commando Solo is an aerial radio and television broadcast platform assigned to the 193d Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard. See Joint Publication 3-53: *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, p. A-2 for additional information.

<sup>21</sup> Joint Publication 3-13: *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, pp. III-1 and III-2.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. The "information systems" category also includes: command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems; infrastructure systems; sensors; and weapon systems. This serves to illustrate the common orientation of IO doctrine toward electronic systems and countermeasures as opposed to human factors.

<sup>23</sup> Christopher M. Centner, "Precision-Guided Propaganda: Exploiting the U.S. Information Advantage in Peacetime". *Strategic Review*, Spring 97, p. 37.

U.S. Army IO doctrine states that adversaries can "attack the *public opinion center of gravity* [COG] and affect operations without ever engaging U.S. forces"<sup>24</sup> A member of the U.S. Army War College faculty recently characterized public opinion as "the strategic high ground of the operational art."<sup>25</sup> Both of these statements imply that U.S., Allied, or Coalition domestic opinion could become a high-payoff propaganda target. This COG could become a vulnerability if not adequately protected.

Deciding what to target may be the most straightforward part of an adversary's propaganda strategy. Potential adversaries have had ample opportunities to observe and analyze our patterns of force employment. What lessons might they have learned? The Commandant of the U.S. Army War College asserts that Western vulnerabilities include: "an aversion to casualties and excessive collateral damage, a sensitivity to domestic and world opinion, and an apparent lack of commitment to prepare for and fight long wars."<sup>26</sup> He also contends that adversaries might fight us-- asymmetrically--to achieve modest goals; "the object will not be decisive victory, but stalemate, stalemate that if continued for any prolonged period of time will inevitably result in the erosion of Western political support for the conflict."<sup>27</sup>

Propaganda provides an opponent with a powerful tool with which to attack the U.S. or Coalition public opinion COG. It also provides another means to overcome both real or perceived force imbalances. The purpose of these attacks could be to affect our

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<sup>24</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 100-6: *Information Operations*, Chapter 3, p. 17 (italics in original). Accessed 13 DEC 00 via the Internet at: <http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-6/ch3.htm>

<sup>25</sup> Colonel Vincent J. Goulding, Jr. "Back to the Future With Asymmetric Warfare." *Parameters*, XXX (4), Winter 00-01, p. 29.

<sup>26</sup> Major General Robert H. Scales, "Adaptive Enemies: Dealing With the Strategic Threat After 2010" *Strategic Review*, Winter 1999, p. 11.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

perseverance. Propaganda could also alter the fundamental legitimacy of our use of force.<sup>28</sup>

Protecting "human factors" from the effects of opponent propaganda are relevant to the JFC.

### **Deficiencies in Joint Counter-propaganda Doctrine**

Joint doctrine represents "authoritative fundamental principles", designed to guide the JFC's employment of military force, so as to best achieve a desired endstate.<sup>29</sup> Existing IO doctrine essentially treats counter-propaganda as a "passive" activity (see Glossary).

Appendix I provides a survey of the counter-propaganda roles and responsibilities currently prescribed by joint doctrine (see Appendix I). Existing doctrine fails to address at least five areas of interest to the JFC.

First, doctrine does not address active measures that the JFC might employ to defeat the effects of propaganda--either proactive (offensive IO), or reactive efforts (counter-propaganda). Second, it lacks clear guidance on how the JFC should organize, plan, and execute counter-propaganda measures. Third, it does not prescribe mechanisms by which counter-propaganda measures might be integrated and synchronized with other joint force activities. Fourth, it fails to specify who is responsible for executing counter-propaganda at each level of war.<sup>30</sup> Finally, PA doctrine denies any attempt to address propaganda. This hinders the potential contributions that this specialty might offer to the counter-propaganda fight. Existing joint doctrine thus offers the JFC limited practical guidance on how to plan and execute this DIO task.

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<sup>28</sup> "Perseverance" and "legitimacy" are two of the six principles for Joint operations other than war (or military operations other than war--MOOTW). Propaganda could also hinder achieving a third MOOTW principle: "security". See Joint Publication 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 01FEB 95, pp. V-1 through V-5. Slobodan Milosevic's use of propaganda during Operation ALLIED FORCE appears to have sought to undermine these three principles.

<sup>29</sup> Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 15 JUL 97, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> The IPI group appears to represent the national-level structure responsible for addressing adversary propaganda.

Perhaps the absence of counter-propaganda doctrine begs the question of whether or not propaganda really is a threat that we ought to prepare for. Will U.S. forces ever be called upon to counter propaganda employed by an "uncooperative" adversary; one who opts to engage us--asymmetrically--in an "information war"?

### **Case Study: Serbia Uses Propaganda as a Weapon**

Information technology will assume greater importance in focusing national power. Publics will have greater access to growing amounts of information. Governments will have to ensure that publics are exposed to accurate details, and that they are able to counter an opponent's disinformation or propaganda campaign, if they are to create and sustain an international political consensus that focuses all efforts on achieving national objectives.<sup>31</sup>

Slobodan Milosevic must have recognized that he could never hope to prevail against NATO's ostensibly superior military forces. Yet, this realization did not deter him from defying NATO's vow to intervene in Kosovo. What accounts for this? A plausible explanation is that Milosevic had confidence in his ability to fight NATO asymmetrically. Propaganda and disinformation were among the principal asymmetric capabilities that he opted to employ.<sup>32</sup> Appendix II provides an analysis of how Milosevic employed propaganda during Operation ALLIED FORCE (see Appendix II). Readers already familiar with Milosevic's use of propaganda during the Operation, may desire to omit reviewing this case study.

### **How NATO Would Have Benefited From Counter-propaganda Measures**

Several aspects of Operation ALLIED FORCE substantiate the benefits that could have been derived from implementing counter-propaganda measures. These recommendations could also be applied to future Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs). Timely

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<sup>31</sup> Douglas V. Johnson II, et. al., "The Principles of War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategic Considerations," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 01 AUG 95, pp. 13-14.

integration of these measures would have helped NATO to gain and maintain the "information initiative." A robust NATO IO effort (both offensive and defensive) might have reduced Milosevic's confidence in the informational element of his strategy; thus encouraging him to concede defeat far sooner. At least three categories of DIO actions would have enabled NATO to reduce the effectiveness of Serbian propaganda.

First, planners should have thoroughly assessed Serbian propaganda capabilities, from which potential enemy IO courses of action (ECOAs) could have been derived. This analysis might have revealed the need for greater integration of operational, theater-strategic, and strategic DIO measures.<sup>33</sup> Identified propaganda ECOAs would have served as the basis for proactive DIO planning. Anticipating enemy propaganda efforts could have prompted the development of counter-propaganda measures, and could also have been incorporated into offensive IO actions. Developing an integrated response among the levels of war would have facilitated mission accomplishment through greater synergy of assets (see Glossary).

Planners need to devise ways to maintain the "information initiative", while denying this advantage to the adversary. NATO IO elements (for example, PSYOP) could have exploited propaganda themes that Milosevic was likely to employ, such as those related to Serbian national mythology. This would have integrated both offensive and defensive IO actions. This might have also displayed NATO's resolve. The defensive (or counter-propaganda) value of these actions rested in their potential to expose Milosevic's propaganda

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<sup>32</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report (Unclassified), 31 JAN 00, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Joint Publication 2-01.3: *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, 24 MAY 00 addresses this requirement. It prescribes the need to analyze enemy PSYOP capabilities, vulnerabilities, and strategies; as well as identifying adversary propaganda themes and techniques. See pages I-7, IV-2, and IV-3. The reader should note that this publication was released approximately one year after the conclusion of Operation ALLIED FORCE.

as hyperbole. This would have decreased his credibility and the effectiveness of his subsequent efforts, thus countering his propaganda in advance.

Second, the identification of friendly COGs and potential vulnerabilities (during the commander's estimate of the situation) could have revealed a sensitivity to collateral damage within NATO's member nations. Measures to protect this vulnerability could have prevented Milosevic from exploiting it as a propaganda theme.<sup>34</sup> Milosevic repeatedly highlighted collateral damage incidents in an attempt to reduce NATO's cohesion and perseverance. Reducing the time that elapsed between collateral damage incidents and their being discussed at press briefings could have reduced Milosevic's ability to exploit this potential NATO vulnerability. This would have lessened the impression that NATO had something to hide. It could also have precluded the media from forming their own conclusions in the absence of official information. This could have reduced the negative political impact that collateral damage incidents had within the NATO member nations.<sup>35</sup> This might also have eased an already laborious NATO target approval process, by reducing the perceived need to impose targeting restrictions (such as were implemented following two major incidents).<sup>36</sup>

Responses to such incidents might have been wargamed in advance of anticipated military actions. Advance planning could have included determining what would be said if operations were successful (for possible exploitation), as well as how errors would be

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<sup>34</sup> Milosevic's attempts to exploit alliance sensitivity to collateral damage was noted in U.S. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report (Unclassified), 31 JAN 00, p. 6.

<sup>35</sup> Posen cites a BBC report that concluded that France, Germany, Greece, and Italy became averse to bombing central Belgrade, as well as Serbian infrastructure targets--all areas with high potential for collateral damage. See Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 2000, p. 69.

<sup>36</sup> Examples of these restrictions include the two-week ban on bombing Belgrade following the inadvertent strike on the Chinese Embassy, and the prohibition on striking bridges before 2200 or after 0200 hours.



addressed.<sup>37</sup> Explanations of both success and failure could have been accompanied by some sort of objective proof. This might have included strike aircraft footage showing exactly what was (or was not) hit, or demonstrating that a target was on a "no strike list" (illustrating, for example, how a church could not have been targeted). While all vulnerabilities might not be amenable to elimination, their identification can lead to the search for possible protection measures. This is related to the third category of actions.

The third measure would have entailed attempting to increase media attention on key subjects that were receiving minimal coverage, such as the plight of Kosovar Albanian refugees. Posen asserts that televised coverage of refugees helped "mobilize European public opinion against the Serbs", and also "galvanized support for the war."<sup>38</sup> Refugee interviews would likely have revealed a desire to flee in order to avoid Serbian ethnic cleansing. This would have served to refute Milosevic's assertion that they were seeking to avoid being targeted by NATO air strikes. Highlighting this alternate subject area could also have compensated for the dearth of reports coming from Belgrade due to Serbian restrictions on Western journalists.

Implementing each of these measures would have required a concerted NATO effort to organize their Information Operations (IO) personnel to plan and execute counter-propaganda measures. It would also have necessitated "routinizing" interaction among those responsible for counter-propaganda.

### **Limitations to Executing Counter-propaganda Programs**

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<sup>37</sup> Both the amplification of successful operations, as well as explaining inadvertent incidents, should be part of the overall IO plan. Some have focused only on the need to explain failure. See Zachary P. Hubbard, "Information Warfare in Kosovo," *Journal of Electronic Defense*, 22 (11), 01 NOV 99, pp. 57-60. Confining public statements solely to the explanation of failure prevents full exploitation of opportunities to gain and maintain the "information initiative."

<sup>38</sup> Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 00, p. 68.

Some information always seeps through. In the absence of trustworthy comparative data, it is almost always misinterpreted. Worse, comforting rumors and messages of hate have the power of incantation where countering data is not readily at hand . . . .

Nor must the debilitating information be outright lies--it may come as messages of faith assuring believers that all of their failures and lacks are the fault of the infidel abroad and the minority in their midst.<sup>39</sup>

Mr. Peters' comments address important aspects of propaganda: the inability to thwart all of an adversary's messages; its ability to invoke strong emotions; as well as the importance of credible information from which to make comparative judgments. While the JFC will want to prepare to meet every credible propaganda threat, there are at least three categories of limitations that might reduce his freedom of action.

The first set of limitations are legal restraints.<sup>40</sup> Public law prohibits both PSYOP and U.S. State Department public affairs activities from targeting U.S. citizens.<sup>41</sup> The second category of limitations pertains to the composition of the joint force.

Combined or coalition operations, for example, present challenges that may hinder implementing an effective counter-propaganda program. Some of these challenges include: allied nations not understanding the potential impact of enemy propaganda, and differing views on who is responsible for counter-propaganda planning and execution. All of these issues surfaced during Operation ALLIED FORCE, and affected attaining synergy between IO and other NATO capabilities.

Overcoming the challenges presented by coalition operations may require early determination that U.S. forces should take the lead in developing counter-propaganda programs (having emphasized the need to address this threat). We may need to actively

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<sup>39</sup> Ralph Peters, "The Plague of Ideas," *Parameters*, XXX (4), Winter 00-01, p. 17.

<sup>40</sup> The term restraints, as used here, refers to externally imposed limits that prohibit certain actions.

encourage coalition leaders to concede using existing U.S. concepts. While U.S. counter-propaganda doctrine is currently limited, coalition members may have not even have a basic conception of where to begin, much less how to proceed.

This does not deny a contributing role for coalition forces. It merely represents the need to determine whose guiding principles will serve as the common basis for planning and execution. Superior understanding of the adversary's military, its leaders, and its populace, are examples of contributions that coalition forces might make. This knowledge of the unique characteristics of the Joint Operational Area (JOA) will be critical to developing an effective counter-propaganda program. It also offers an opportunity to co-opt coalition members so as to enhance unity of effort. Overcoming the challenges of operating in a coalition might determine whether executing a counter-propaganda program is even possible.

The final set of limitations are Rules of Engagement (ROE) for defensive IO activities.<sup>42</sup> IO ROE should determine which counter-propaganda actions the JFC has the authority to execute. They should also include who has the authority to approve proposed JFC IO actions. The JFC might not have the authority to approve certain counter-propaganda products or actions, even though he has the authority to execute these once approved.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Title VI of Public Law 102-88: "National Security Act", 14 AUG 91 prohibits PSYOP from targeting U.S. citizens; The "Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act" of 1998 places similar restrictions on U.S. State Department personnel.

<sup>42</sup> While ROE are not technically either a constraint or a restraint, they have the same effect as either type of limitation; viz., ROE limit the JFC's freedom of action (at least until desired modified ROE are approved). IO ROE are analogous to traditional ROE governing access to land, sea, or air space. The difference is that IO ROE address legal or policy concerns related to accessing a given "info-space". The boundaries of a given "info-space" are limited primarily by communications links instead of geography. The network and server paths through which an individual gains access to the Internet, are an example of "info-space". The impact of IO ROE should be analyzed during the first step in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES): Mission Analysis.

<sup>43</sup> Approval of PSYOP products, and approval for their release are an example of this limitation. The time required to obtain counter-propaganda product approval or release authority should also be considered during planning and when synchronizing execution. U.S. National Security Directive 130: U.S. International Information Policy prescribes the approval authority for PSYOP products. This authority rests with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (DASD SO/LIC). During

Despite these limitations, the JFC has the resources to negate the effects of adversary propaganda. Directing these assets toward the appropriate targets, and properly synchronizing their individual capabilities, can help to ensure that the JFC is prepared to counter the effects of the propaganda threat.

### **Three Measures That the JFC Can Implement Today**

Three categories of measures will enable the JFC to implement an integrated strategy to counter adversary propaganda. First, organize IO personnel to plan and execute counter-propaganda measures. Second, "routinize" interaction among those responsible for counter-propaganda. Third, conduct challenging exercises in order to enhance joint force readiness to meet, and defeat, the effects of opponent propaganda. Each of these recommendations can be implemented with existing JFC assets.

Implementing these measures, as a part of the overall IO effort, will facilitate attaining both "full dimensional protection" and synergy among the elements of the joint force. These recommendations are not designed to dictate how the JFC should utilize his staff. They are intended to demonstrate how integrating the capabilities of the IO staff section, the J2, PA, and PSYOP can posture the JFC to win the propaganda fight.

#### **Organize**

Organizing involves assigning clear roles and responsibilities for counter-propaganda planning and execution. The JFC's IO chief should have the overall responsibility for counter-propaganda measures. The IO chief must integrate and synchronize the IO efforts of approximately 15 command and staff functions, all service and functional components, as well as supporting commands. This can make the rank of the IO chief a critical element to

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declared hostilities, PSYOP approval authority may be delegated to the JFC. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual: 3500.08: *Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) Headquarters Master Training*

success. Positioning the IO section under the J3 (as is typical) will enable the IO chief to benefit from the J3's tasking authority. The IO chief will rely on this authority to direct counter-propaganda planning and execution tasks. Other elements of the joint force will execute the majority of these tasks, due to the limited size of the IO section. This makes access to the J3 essential. Frequent interaction between the J3 and the IO chief makes their co-location advisable.

Counter-propaganda planning must begin during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES). The IO chief will rely on the J2 and the Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) staff to analyze adversary propaganda capabilities. The J2 and JPOTF J2 should coordinate their analysis of the propaganda-related factors inherent in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB). This will ensure that all adversary capabilities are considered during the CES, and in the final plan.

Counter-propaganda planning must also delineate responsibilities for execution at each level of war. As previously noted, the JFC may be responsible for executing tasks that have both operational and strategic significance. Determining responsibilities in advance will enhance synchronization, avoid duplication of effort, and contribute to attaining synergy among counter-propaganda activities. The JFC may find it helpful to use the Executive Steering Group (ESG) as the forum to coordinate and deconflict counter-propaganda responsibilities.<sup>44</sup>

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*Guide*, 26 MAY 99, Section 1.7.

<sup>44</sup> One of the primary functions of the ESG is to coordinate theater aspects of strategic policy. The ESG may also be involved in coordinating the responsibilities of the JFC with those of an Interagency Working Group (IWG). In the case of counter-propaganda, this IWG would be the IPI group. See Joint Publication 3-08: *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, 09 OCT 96, pp. III-15 and III-16, for additional information on the roles and functions of an ESG.

Timing is perhaps the most critical factor in implementing counter-propaganda measures. Attitudes and opinions don't form--or change--overnight. Early implementation of counter-propaganda measures will inhibit the adversary from gaining the "information initiative". The JFC must seize this advantage early as part of the overall effort to shape the battlespace and set the conditions for success. This will be easier than attempting to wrest it from an adversary after operations have begun.<sup>45</sup> Early implementation should also reduce the effectiveness of the adversary's propaganda efforts; thus hindering his ability to attack our legitimacy and perseverance. Implementing counter-propaganda measures early--at all levels of war--will make the informational element of power work to the JFC's advantage.

Execution primarily involves the JPOTF and the PA staff. These are the JFC's two primary tools for communicating to external audiences. The JFC might opt to use either or both, depending upon the intended audience. The IO Chief must ensure that PA and JPOTF activities are coordinated, even though they communicate to different audiences. This will ensure that their respective messages are consistent, and will also help maintain the credibility of both elements.<sup>46</sup>

While the PA staff might be reluctant to be associated with counter-propaganda, they bring significant value to the fight. It should be possible to use PA to "project the truth" without jeopardizing their credibility. Overwhelming an audience with truth can indirectly

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<sup>45</sup> The Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report identified the need to "ensure that IO planning is initiated early and synchronized with other operational plans" as a "major observation". See U.S. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report (Unclassified), 31 JAN 00, pp. 15, 98-99, and 135

<sup>46</sup> Inconsistencies between PA and PSYOP messages might also provide an adversary with themes to exploit with his propaganda strategy.

counter adversary propaganda, by providing comparative information. PA, unlike PSYOP, is also able to communicate to U.S. audiences.<sup>47</sup>

The final contributions that PA offers pertain to two functions of the Joint Information Bureau (JIB): media analysis and media support.<sup>48</sup> Media analysis identifies adversary use of use propaganda, and also evaluates it content. This information should be incorporated into subsequent counter-propaganda measures. It can also indicate the effectiveness of the JFC's offensive and defensive IO measures. The media support function could focus journalists on areas that the JFC desires to highlight.

The JPOTF should be the primary element responsible for developing counter-propaganda products. The JPOTF will also be involved in offensive IO, so integrating these actions with counter-propaganda (or defensive IO) measures will be simplified. The JPOTF J2 should also seek information from prisoners of war and civilian detainees (as applicable). This information will be useful to measure the effectiveness of both offensive and defensive IO measures. The JPOTF must also ensure that PSYOP actions are deconflicted and synchronized with those outside a designated JOA, and with national-level activities.

### **Routinize**

"Routinizing" consists of creating a habitual interaction among those tasked with counter-propaganda planning and execution. This interaction enhances the JFC's ability to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize counterpropaganda measures. It also offers opportunities to clarify roles and responsibilities during each phase of the operation.

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<sup>47</sup> PA will also assist in implementing the Commander's Internal Information Program (CIIP). The CIIP is designed to ensure that U.S. forces and their families receive accurate information about the mission; thus shielding them from the effects of adversary propaganda. See COL W.C. Garrison, "Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public Affairs," Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999, pp. 3 and 11.

The IO chief must ensure that counter-propaganda measures are integrated into subsequent planning (such as the development of branches and sequels). Counter-propaganda activities, like any other, will require modification after an operation commences. The IO chief should also coordinate counter-propaganda measures with appropriate boards, such as the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) and the JIB. No board currently exists for integrating IO, though one has been proposed. The Joint Information Coordination Group (JICG) identified in the Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide appears to offer a forum to better integrate IO with other joint force actions; however, its specific purpose and task are still being developed.<sup>49</sup> The JICG could perform functions similar to the JTCB, but would emphasize the strategy for non-lethal fires.

"Routinizing" would acknowledge the priority that the JFC places on countering the effects of adversary propaganda. It will combine the skills of all appropriate elements in implementing counter-propaganda measures. It will also help overcome the limitations of each element, avoid duplication of effort, and fully exploit joint force capabilities.

### Exercise

Finally, counter-propaganda capabilities will be strengthened by exercising these skills during realistic training scenarios. Incorporating threat force propaganda capabilities and actions into exercise Master Scenario Event Lists (MSELs) will validate our ability to apply these skills against a future adversary. Realistic exercises that challenge planners to deal with the propaganda threat will strengthen readiness. To invert a common phrase: we

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<sup>48</sup> The JIB is the focal point between the joint force and commercial media representatives. See Joint Publication 3-61: *Joint doctrine for Public Affairs*, 14 MAY 97. III-8 through III-12 for additional details regarding the JIB and its functions.

<sup>49</sup> CJCS Manual 3500.05: *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*, 15 APR 97, p. 5-12.



fight as we have trained. We should therefore assess our ability to implement counter-propaganda measures during rigorous exercises.

Exercising counter-propaganda capabilities will also solidify the benefits derived from "organizing" and "routinizing". Exercises will strengthen a mutual understanding of counter-propaganda planning responsibilities; will aid in "routinizing" interaction during execution; and will establish participation of DIO representatives on key joint force boards. Exercises could also provide an ideal mechanism for reviewing existing plans. This will confirm that all plans include a detailed analysis of enemy propaganda capabilities.

Exercising JFC counter-propaganda capabilities, and reviewing existing plans, will clearly benefit the ability to implement these measures. It could also identify areas requiring interagency level coordination (such as the JFC's role in achieving the regional and country objectives established by the IPI group). Implementing these measures will prepare the JFC to execute his role in defeating adversary propaganda, and will ensure that joint force counter-propaganda activities are integrated with strategic level actions.

### **Conclusion**

Operation ALLIED FORCE represented two "firsts" in the conduct of Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs). It was the first time when the use of diplomacy and the military air instrument (alone) produced a settlement. It could also be considered our first exposure to an "uncooperative" adversary who employed propaganda as an asymmetric means to overcome Allied strengths. Joint Defensive IO (DIO) doctrine (then only six months old), with its heavy emphasis on technical measures (such as computer network defense), provided U.S. and NATO forces with little guidance on developing and synchronizing a coordinated counter-propaganda response.

Joint DIO doctrine must be refined to better guide the JFC. The prescriptive function of doctrine takes on increased importance in guiding commanders in executing important--though evolving--tasks such as DIO. Professional journals and DoD research organizations have clearly described how IO will assume greater importance in future military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Yet, strengthening joint doctrine alone will not be sufficient to adequately address threat propaganda capabilities. Furthermore, revised DIO doctrine might not be produced prior to the next requirement to employ U.S. forces.

JFCs already possess the basic assets to fulfill their role in executing counter-propaganda measures. They can start today by organizing their IO personnel to plan and execute counter-propaganda; by "routinizing" interaction among counter-propaganda planners; and by conducting challenging exercises that prepare these planners to defeat adversary propaganda efforts. These proposals can--and should--be implemented today.

The lessons from Operation ALLIED FORCE have, and will no doubt continue to be scrutinized. What has yet to be determined is who will learn from these lessons. Adversary propaganda is an asymmetric threat that the JFC ought to take more seriously. The informational element of power is an inexpensive means by which an adversary might gain a relative advantage. The United States is clearly postured to turn this capability into a strength, and to prevent adversary propaganda from having an adverse impact on mission accomplishment. Our ability to win the "information war" may well prove crucial to the duration, cost, and decisiveness of future conflict.

## APPENDICES

## **Appendix I: Survey of Joint Counter-propaganda Doctrine**

### **IO Doctrine**

Joint IO doctrine identifies counter-propaganda as an IO "capability and related activity." This places IO in the same category as two other "related activities": PA and Civil Affairs<sup>50</sup>. DIO Implementation Instructions identify counter-propaganda as part of the DIO process, as well as the attack detection process.<sup>51</sup> This same source tasks the JFC to effectively integrate DIO measures into staff procedures<sup>52</sup>. Procedural guidance for DIO execution provides detailed procedures for reporting attempts to attack networks, but does not mention propaganda.<sup>53</sup>

### **Intelligence Doctrine**

Joint Intelligence doctrine addresses the need to analyze adversary IO capabilities as a general intelligence task, and the psychological aspect of the battlespace as an operational intelligence task.<sup>54</sup> Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) doctrine prescribes adversary propaganda as both strategic and operational level JIPB tasks.<sup>55</sup> This source also identifies adversary propaganda capabilities as an IO threat that should be analyzed as part of JIPB.<sup>56</sup> The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia states that the JFC "should take measures to protect friendly C2 systems from adversary PSYOP."<sup>57</sup>

### **PA Doctrine**

Joint PA doctrine denies any attempt to address propaganda as part of their programs.<sup>58</sup> The Commander's Internal Information Program (a command function supported by PA activities) provides information about the mission to U.S. forces and their families. This helps shield them from the effects of adversary propaganda. PA's Public Information activities provide similar information to commercial journalists.<sup>59</sup> While credible information certainly helps immunize against the effects of adversary propaganda, this is an indirect approach.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Joint Pub. 3-13: Joint Doctrine for IO, 09 OCT 98, pp. I-9 and I-10.

<sup>51</sup> CJCS Instruction 6510.01B: Defensive Information Operations Policy (with Change 1), 26 AUG 98, pp. A-1 and A-11.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. C-3.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., Enclosure D.

<sup>54</sup> Joint Pub. 2-0: Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 09 MAR 00, p. III-7 and III-8.

<sup>55</sup> Joint Pub. 2-01.3: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, 24 MAY 00, p. I-7.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. IV-1 thru IV-3.

<sup>57</sup> Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, s.v. "Command and Control Protection", 16 JUL 97, p. 163.

<sup>58</sup> Joint Publication 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, 14 MAY 97, pp. II-2 and II-6.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. II-6.

<sup>60</sup> Joint IO doctrine validates the value of factual information in countering adversary propaganda. See Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for IO, 09 OCT 98, p. III-7.

### **PSYOP Doctrine**

Joint PSYOP lists countering adversary propaganda as PSYOP's main DIO task.<sup>61</sup> It also lists counter-propaganda as an objective common to all joint conventional operations.<sup>62</sup> PSYOP doctrine also dictates that PSYOP planners should "write a collection plan with specific intelligence and counterintelligence collection requirements focusing on the enemy's capabilities to jam PSYOP signals and conduct counter-PSYOP."<sup>63</sup> Figure IV-2: "Specific PSYOP Guidance and Considerations for Planners" specifies that "efforts should be made to prepare PSYOP to counter the effects of an adversary's psychological warfare effort before, during, and after US military combat operations."<sup>64</sup> Additionally, PSYOP doctrine identifies PA as a useful means to counter propaganda and disinformation directed at U.S. audiences (however PA doctrine does not validate this role).<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Joint Publication 3-53: Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, 10 JUL 96, pp. I-8 and V-2.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp. V-4 and V-5.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., pp. VI-2 & VI-3.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. IV-5.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. I-5.

## **Appendix II: Case Study--How Serbia Used Propaganda to Fight NATO During Operation ALLIED FORCE**

### **The Road to War**

Operation ALLIED FORCE was intended to halt a decade of tension and violence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)--primarily in the FRY province of Kosovo.<sup>66</sup> In 1998, ethnic Albanians had formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The Serbian government considered the KLA an insurgent force. The Serbian army and police force were soon engaged in significant conflict with the KLA.

International diplomatic efforts produced a draft accord titled the "Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo" in February, 1999. The term "agreement" was misleading. Neither the Kosovar Albanian representatives nor those of the FRY government consented to the document's provisions. The FRY president, Slobodan Milosevic, took exception to several of the accord's provisions--particularly those pertaining to the future status of Kosovo, and to its "military clause".<sup>67</sup> Ethnic violence in Kosovo continued. So did NATO's vow to impose a settlement if Serbian attacks did not cease.

### **NATO Intervenes**

Operation ALLIED FORCE began on 24 March 1999. Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, anticipated that two or three days of NATO military strikes would be sufficient to force Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet Agreement.<sup>68</sup> Slobodan Milosevic proved to be an uncooperative adversary. Operation ALLIED FORCE lasted 78 days. What accounted for the difference between expectations and reality? A plausible explanation is that Milosevic believed that he could gain a relative advantage over NATO by employing propaganda (the informational element of national power).<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> This paper often refers to the adversary state as Serbia, instead of its official title: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The author does so for two reasons. First, the Serbian nationalist identity--as embellished by Slobodan Milosevic--served as a primary means to gain domestic support for the conflict. Second, at the time of the operation, the FRY, its military, and its police force were predominantly comprised of Serbs. See Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 2000, pp. 40-41, for additional details on why this distinction is appropriate.

<sup>67</sup> Analysis of the Rambouillet Agreement reveals at least two provisions that Milosevic could have perceived as threats to FRY sovereignty. First, Section IV of the Agreement established a specific timetable for holding elections in Kosovo. This process could have resulted in its succession from the FRY. Second, Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force, item 8 (commonly referred to as the "military clause") states that "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations." See U.S. Department of State Archive web site at: [http://www.state.gov/regions/eur/ksvo\\_rambouillet\\_text.html](http://www.state.gov/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html).

<sup>68</sup> Inside the Pentagon, 20 APR 00, p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Myth of Information Superiority," *Parameters*, Spring 00, p. 23.

## **Serbia's Propaganda Strategy**

While Milosevic's exact goals are not known, two strategists have attempted to deduce what these may have been. Dr. Posen asserts that Milosevic's strategy centered on attempting to shatter cohesion among NATO member nations. The primary focus of these efforts would be to exploit NATO's aversion to collateral damage by highlighting any inadvertent incidents that might occur.<sup>70</sup> Thomas contends that one of Milosevic's two objectives was to attack NATO's COG: the political stability of the alliance.<sup>71</sup> Thus Milosevic used propaganda as a weapon to target NATO perseverance. Posen also contends that Milosevic's strategy made sense, citing alliance concerns that they might not be able to sustain domestic political support for the Operation.<sup>72</sup> The final element of Milosevic's strategy was his use of propaganda to indoctrinate Serbs with a sense of hypernationalism, and hatred toward Kosovar ethnic Albanians.

## **Milosevic's Propaganda Assets & Media Controls**

Milosevic acquired near total control over FRY media in the early 1980s, in conjunction with the unraveling of the former Yugoslav state. Economic difficulties led to the closure of many newspapers.<sup>73</sup> Small news organizations, most of which had expressed more liberal views, either went bankrupt or were taken over by nationalists. The FRY government subsequently took control of all television stations.<sup>74</sup> Milosevic completed his domination of the Serbian media in 1998 when the "Public Information Law" was passed.<sup>75</sup> This law permitted the Serbian government to imprison or fine broadcasters deemed to have published displeasing material. It also gave the government the ability to restrict broadcasting programs from Western sources (such as the British Broadcasting Corporation).<sup>76</sup>

Milosevic's control over Serbian media proved useful during Operation ALLIED FORCE. In a national broadcast, on 25 March 1999, Milosevic characterized NATO's intentions as including occupying all of Serbia.<sup>77</sup> Government officials halted all broadcasts originating from external sources as soon as the Operation began.<sup>78</sup> The Serbian Ministry of Information directed that all journalists would thereafter refer to NATO forces as

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<sup>70</sup> Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security, Spring 00, p. 51.

<sup>71</sup> Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters, Spring 00, p. 22.

<sup>72</sup> Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security, Spring 00, p. 60.

<sup>73</sup> Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, eds., The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 170.

<sup>74</sup> Carol Rogel, A War of Myths, Propaganda and Balkan Politics: the Break-Up of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 12.

<sup>75</sup> Connie L. Stephens, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Reinventing U.S. Strategic Communications in the Era of Slobodan Milosevic," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition, p. 4.

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Televised Defiance Lost Amid Sirens, Blasts, and Fireballs," The New York Times, 25 MAR 99, p. A12.

<sup>78</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Televised Defiance Lost Amid Sirens, Blasts, and Fireballs," The New York Times, 25 MAR 99, p. A12.

"criminals".<sup>79</sup> Serbian military action was explained as a response to KLA and NATO aggression.<sup>80</sup> Milosevic's controls enabled him to manipulate information coming into Serbia, and also the information that the Serbian population was exposed to.

Milosevic subsequently used Serbian police forces to harass, arrest, and imprison foreign journalists.<sup>81</sup> Serbian controls also limited foreign correspondents' freedom of movement.<sup>82</sup> Journalists were only able to leave Belgrade under Serbian Army escort. Milosevic's restrictions prevented journalists from substantiating reports of "ethnic cleansing." They were permitted to visit sites where NATO had inflicted collateral damage, but not Serb casualty sites.<sup>83</sup> Footage of collateral damage revolted publics within NATO member nations, and threatened alliance solidarity. It also led to the imposition of targeting restrictions, compounding an already labyrinthine process of target approval.<sup>84</sup> [This case study is continued in the section titled: "How NATO Would Have Benefited From Counter-propaganda Measures" (see page 10).]

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Phillip M. Taylor, "Propaganda and the Web War," The World Today, JUN 99, p. 10.

<sup>81</sup> Lawrie Miffin, "Serbs Hold Foreign Reporters," The New York Times, 25 MAR 99, p. A14.

<sup>82</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Support for Homeland Up as Sirens Wail and News is Censored," The New York Times, 29 MAR 99, p. A1.

<sup>83</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Small Serbian Town is Stricken by a Deadly Accident of War," The New York Times, 07 APR 99, pp. A1 and A10.

<sup>84</sup> Dana Priest, "Bombing by Committee," The Washington Post, 20 SEP 99, p. A1.



## **Glossary**

### **Accessibility.**

The availability of an audience for targeting by PSYOP. Having PSYOP dissemination means within range of the target audience does not always guarantee that the audience can receive the PSYOP message, or that military PSYOP can be used on that audience. For example, one rule of engagement may forbid U.S. military PSYOP from targeting forces well within range of a U.S. military PSYOP-operated radio transmitter. In this case, these forces would be considered inaccessible to the United States. (Army Field Manual [FM] 33-1-1: Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures).

### **Command And Control Protection (C2-Protect).**

Command and control (C2) protection maintains effective C2 of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. Synchronized command and control warfare (C2W) operations should enable a Joint Force Commander (JFC) to operate "inside" an adversary's decision cycle by allowing the JFC to process information through the C2 decision cycle faster than an adversary commander. Initiative is fundamental to success in military operations. In C2W, both C2-attack and C2-protect operations contribute to gaining and maintaining military initiative. (Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, s.v. "Command and Control Protection", p. 164 and Joint Pub 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).

### **Counter-intelligence (CI).**

Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities (Joint Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations).

### **Counter-propaganda.**

Any form of communication directed at the audiences of enemy propaganda. Counter-propaganda is designed to counteract enemy or other foreign propaganda and to capitalize on vulnerabilities in their campaign (U.S. Army Field Manual [FM] 3-05.30: Psychological Operations).

### **Counter-propaganda Operations.**

Activities identifying adversary propaganda in order to enhance situational awareness and expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces (Joint Pub 3-13).

**Defensive Information Operations (DIO).**

The integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems. Defensive Information Operations (DIO) are conducted through information assurance, physical security, operations security, counter-deception, counter-psychological operations, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations. DIO ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes (Joint Pub 3-13).

**Effectiveness.**

The actual ability of the target audience to carry out the behavior response indicated in the PSYOP objective. If the target audience is susceptible to persuasion, the target analyst must assess the relative capability of the target audience to perform the desired behavior. The most important factors in making this determination are restrictions and influence. Restrictions are the physical, sociological, political, emotional, and economic constraints that keep the target audience from performing some action. For example, Japanese culture considers surrender to an enemy dishonorable. For that reason, during World War II, it was extremely difficult for the Allies to convince Japanese soldiers to surrender. Even toward the end of the war when all hope for victory was gone and nothing could be gained by further resistance, the Japanese continued to resist surrender. (Army FM 33-1-1).

**Information.**

Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. It is the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. The same information may convey different messages to different recipients and thereby provide "mixed signals" to information gatherers and users, to include the intelligence community (Joint Pub 3-13, p. I-9).

**Information Operations (IO).**

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems (Joint Pubs 1-02 & 3-13). Joint Vision 2020 further states that IO also include actions taken in a noncombat or ambiguous situation to protect one's own information and information systems as well as those taken to influence target information and information systems. The objective of IO are: providing information, perception management, battlefield dominance, command and control warfare, systemic disruption, or systemic destruction. These objectives are applicable across the spectrum of military operations (Joint Vision 2020, pp. 28 & 29).

IO are conducted through the integration of many capabilities and related activities. Major capabilities to conduct IO include, but are not limited to, OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, and physical attack/destruction, and could include Computer Network Attack (CAN). IO-related activities include, but are not limited to, Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Affairs (CA) activities. There are two major subdivisions within IO: offensive IO and defensive IO (Joint Pub 3-13, pp. I-9 & I-10).

**Information Operations Threat.**

An adversary that is organized, resourced, and politically sponsored/motivated to affect decision makers (Joint Pub 3-13).

**Information System.**

The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. (Joint Pub 3-13, p. GL-7). (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02: DOD Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms).

**Information Warfare (IW).**

Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries (Joint Pub 3-13, pp. GL-7 & GL-8).

**Propaganda.**

Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (Joint Pub 1-02).

**Psychological Operations (PSYOP).**

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives (Joint Pubs 1-02 & 3-53: Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations).

**Susceptibility.**

The degree to which the target audience can be influenced to respond in a manner that will help accomplish the PSYOP mission. Simply put, how well can a vulnerability be manipulated? For example, if a food shortage creates a vulnerability of hunger, the last time a target audience ate a healthy meal might very well determine how susceptible the target audience is to this vulnerability. (Army FM 33-1-1).

**Synergy.**

Synergy results when the elements of the joint force are so effectively employed that their total military impact exceeds the sum of their individual contributions. JFCs not only attack the enemy's physical capabilities but also the enemy's morale and will. Synergy is achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions. It enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy to exploit (Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, s.v. "Synergy", pp. 674-75). (This author condensed the definition of "Synergy" from the full version found in the source document).

**Target Audience.**

A collection of people who have common characteristics and vulnerabilities that may make them susceptible to the effects of a PSYOP program. (Army FM 33-1-1).

**Vulnerability.**

A psychological factor that might be exploited. These psychological factors (or vulnerabilities) fall into four broad categories: perception, motivation, stress, and attitudes. PSYOP analysts evaluate each target audience and determine which, if any, vulnerabilities exist. For example, lack of food creates a vulnerability of hunger (the psychological factor of stress). (Army FM 33-1-1).

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